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Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
I. INTRODUCTION
Child abuse and neglect are growing problems in America. Though
it is not clear whether the rise in reported cases is due to greater aware-
ness of the issue or to an actual increase in the incidence of child abuse
and neglect,' states have resorted to greater intervention into family au-
tonomy to combat the rising tide of child abuse.
In Santosky v. Kramer,2 the Supreme Court reviewed one state's at-
tempt to deal with child abuse. The Court considered the constitution-
ality of the New York Family Court Act,3 which allowed the State to
separate parents from their children upon proof, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the parents had permanently neglected their chil-
dren. 4 In concluding that the due process clause of the United States
Constitution mandated proof by at least clear and convincing evidence
in such proceedings, the Court employed a test which balanced the pri-
vate interests involved, the risk of error inherent in the challenged pro-
ceedings and the State's interest in retaining the challenged procedure.
This Note will explore the Court's treatment of these factors.
The Court's decision also relied on due process decisions which in-
volved a determination of the proper standard of proof. In these cases, a
higher standard of proof was found to be constitutionally mandated by
the due process clause of the Constitution. This Note will examine the
Court's reliance on these due process cases.
I See V.J. FONTANA & D.J. BESHAROV, THE MALTREATED CHILD ix, xi, 4 (4th ed.
1979); S.Z. NACI, CHILD MALTREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1977); D.G. GIL, VIO-
LENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 3 (1970).
2 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
3 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 111 (McKinney 1976).
4 Id. § 622.
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II. THE FACTS OF SANTOSKY V KRAMER
In 1973, the Ulster County Department of Social Services received
reports from neighbors and physicians regarding Tina Santosky's inju-
ries.5 Tina's injuries included a fractured femur, bodily bruises and
abrasions. 6 Fearing that Tina was the victim of child abuse, the County
instituted a temporary neglect proceeding 7 against the Santosky parents
to remove Tina temporarily from the Santosky home." The County suc-
ceeded in placing Tina in State custody in November, 1972.9 Ten
months later, the County removed John Santosky III from the home
after hospital personnel had determined that John suffered from malnu-
trition.10 Three days after that, the County placed Jed Santosky, only
three days old, in a foster home. I I
Once a New York county has temporarily removed a child from his
or her home and placed the child in foster care, 12 the State of New York
may institute permanent neglect proceedings which, if successful, termi-
nate all parent-child relations and allow others to adopt the child.' 3
The New York Family Court Act provides that the State may perma-
nently terminate parental rights by proving (1) that for more than one
year after the child was removed by the County, the foster care agency
"made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental rela-
tionship,"14 and (2) that during that period, the natural parents failed
"substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with
or plan for the future of the child although physically and financially
able to do so.' 1 5 Both these elements must be proven by a "fair prepon-
derance of the evidence."' 6
The County began permanent neglect proceedings against the
Santoskys in 1978. The Ulster County Family Court held that the
5 Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1393.
6 Id. at 1409, n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7 Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1393.
8 A neglected child is one "whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been im-
paired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent
• ..to exercise a minimum degree of care in supplying the child with adequate food, cloth-
ing, shelter or education .. " N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1012(0 (McKinney 1976).
9 The order for temporary removal was issued under Id. § 1022.
10 Santosky, 102 S Ct. at 1393.
1 Although there was no allegation of neglect with respect to Jed, he was removed based
on the alleged neglect of the two older children. Id.
12 "Foster care" refers to a temporary relationship in which an adult "receives a child for
'board and care' either from a state welfare commission or from a recognized social agency."
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 23
(1973).
13 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384 (McKinney 1976).
14 Id. §§ 611, 614.1(c).
15 Id. § 614.1(d).
16 Id. § 622.
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Santoskys' failure to plan and care for their children was excused be-
cause of their indigence.17 Thus, the State could not prove the second
element of its case and the proceedings were dismissed.13
In 1979, the County initiated a second permanent neglect proceed-
ing against the Santoskys.' 9 The three Santosky children, Tina, John III
and Jed, were adjudged to be permanently neglected. On April 5, 1979,
the Ulster County Family Court entered an order permanently termi-
nating the Santoskys' parental rights.2 0 The Santoskys appealed, con-
tending that the New York Family Court Act violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2'
The appellate division upheld the lower court's termination, noting
that the "permanent neglect statute recognizes and seeks to balance
rights possessed by the child with those of the natural parents.'"22 The
Santoskys then petitioned the United States Supreme Court to consider
whether the State must prove permanent neglect by more than a pre-
ponderance of the evidence when seeking to permanently separate par-
ents from their children.23
III. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN SANTOSKY V.
KRAMER
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment mandates a higher standard
than proof by a preponderance of the evidence before the State may
permanently terminate parental rights.24 Justice Blackmun delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell
and Stevens joined.
The Court first found that natural parents have a fundamental lib-
erty interest under the fourteenth amendment in the "care, custody and
management of their children."2-5 The Court stated that such interest
was not extinguished by the fact that the family had already been sepa-
17 See Matter of Santosky, 89 Misc. 2d 730, 393 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1977). For dismissal of the
appeal, see In re John W., 63 App, Div. 2d 750, 404 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1978).
18 See N.Y. FANi. CT. AcT § 614.1(d) (McKinney 1976).
I~ See Brief for Petitioners, at 2, 12, Santosky, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
20 Orders permanently terminating parental rights were entered on April 5, 1979. In re
John 'AA", 75 A.D.2d 910, 427 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). See Brief for
Petitioners, pt 2, 12, Santosky, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
21 Id.
22 Id. 427 N.Y.S.2d at 320. In In re John *'AA," the court followed its decision ofIn re
Anthony L. -'CC", 48 A.D.2d 415, 370 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), which upheld
the constitutionality of § 622 of the Family Court Act.
23 Santosky v. Kramer, 450 U.S. 993 (1981).
24 Sanlosk', 102 S. Ct. at 1402.
25 Id. at 1394.
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rated as a result of a temporary neglect proceeding.26 The Court said,
wherf the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must pro-
vide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures2 7 which comport
with the due process clause of the Constitution.
To determine what process is due to parents seeking to prevent the
State from permanently terminating parental rights, the Court applied
the balancing test enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge .28 The Eldridge test
calculates and balances the relative weights of three factors: (1) "the
private interests affected by the proceeding;" (2) "the risk of error cre-
ated by the State's chosen procedure;" and (3) "the countervailing gov-
ernmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. 2 9
Although the Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Servi'es had ap-
plied the Eldridge factors in conjunction with a presumption favoring the
constitutionality of the challenged procedure,30 the Court found such
use of a presumption inappropriate in Santosky. 31 The Court noted, "de-
cisions concerning constitutional burdens of proof have not turned on
any presumption favoring any particular standard. 32
In examining the private interests affected by the challenged proce-
dure, the Court considered "both the nature of the private interest
threatened and the permanency of the threatened loss. ' '33 The Court
said that the private interests included the parents' interest in maintain-
ing familial bonds, an interest far exceeding mere property rights. 34
This interest was enhanced by the fact that the family court's decision
terminating parental rights, once affirmed on appeal, is final and irrevo-
cable.35 The interests of the children were not considered as a compo-
nent of the private interests. The Court said that, in such proceedings,
the "State cannot presume that a child and his parents are adversa-
ries."' 36 Therefore, the interests of the children cannot be determined
until parental unfitness has been proven.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
29 Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1394.
30 See Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
31 Sanlosk), 102 S. Ct. at 1394.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1397.
34 Id.; see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
35 The Court noted that parents may petition the family court to set aside an order. How-
ever, the order, once affirmed on appeal, is reviewable only on narrow grounds, such as newly
discovered evidence or fraud. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1392 n.l.
Further, in Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982),
the Court determined that an aggrieved parent could not use a writ of habeas corpus as a
basis for review of a family court order permanently terminating parental rights.
36 SantosAy, 102 S. Ct. at 1398. Similarly, the interests of the foster parents were disre-
garded as "not implicated directly in the factfinding stage of a State-initiated permanent
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The Court next considered the risk of error inherent in the use of
the proof by a preponderance of the evidence standard in parental
rights termination hearings. The Court noted that the factfinder has a
great deal of discretion in deciding whether the State has proven its
case.37 The Family Court Act requires the factfinder to make highly
subjective decisions in appraising the diligence of the agency's efforts to
reunite the family 38 and the substantiality of the parents' contact with
the children.39 The Court implied that with highly subjective determi-
nations, the potential for erroneous termination is great.40 The Court
then noted that since the typical parent involved in such proceedings
was poor and uneducated, the decisions might reflect class and cultural
biases of the factfinder.41 The risk of erroneous termination was also
enhanced by the fact that the State, as an adversary, could use its
greater expertise and financial resources to overwhelm the parents.42
Further, since the State employs the agency's caseworkers, the primary
witnesses in the action, the likelihood of erroneous terminations was in-
creased by the potential partiality of the key witnesses. 43 Finally, the
Court noted that the State, as custodian of removed children, could con-
trol parent-child contact prior to the proceeding to prevent parents from
maintaining the requisite contact with their children.4
4
The Court next considered whether a higher standard of proof
would reduce the risk of erroneous terminations. 45 Since raising the stan-
dard of proof by which the State must prove its case would "reduc[e] the
risk of convictions resting on factual error," 46 the Court determined that
neglect proceeding" against the natural parents. Id. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 615, 1055(d)
(McKinney 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 392.7(c) (McKinney 1976).
37 102 S. Ct. at 1399.
38 The Family Court Act, though requiring the foster care agency to make diligent efforts
to reunite the family, allows the factfinder to disregard less than diligent efforts if such efforts
would have been "detrimental to the moral and temporal welfare of the child." N.Y. FAM.
CT. AcT § 614.1(c) (McKinney 1976).
39 The factfinder may "discount actual visits or communications on the grounds that they
were insubstantial or 'overtly demonstrat[ed] a lack of affectionate and concerned
parenthood.'" (citation omitted) Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1399 n.12.
40 Id. at 1399.
41 Id. The Court did not articulate its reasons for finding that such proceedings could be
vulnerable to class and cultural biases.
42 Id.
4 3 Id.
44 Id. See note 15 and accompanying text. The Santoskys alleged that the State had
sought court orders denying them the right to visit their children. Brief for Appellant at 9,
Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982). The Brief for Appellant also points out that the
State may introduce as evidence the parents' refusal to accept proferred social services to
demonstrate the State's diligent efforts to reunite the family and the parents' failure to plan
for the future of their child. Brief for Appellant at 10-11.
45 Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1400.
46 Id. (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)).
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requiring proof beyond a preponderance of the evidence would reduce
the risk of erroneous terminations.47
Finally, the Court examined the interests of the State in retaining
the challenged procedure. The Court found two legitimate State inter-
ests in parental termination proceedings: (1) aparenspatriae interest in
preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and (2) a fiscal and
administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceed-
ings.48 The Court found that both State interests would be served by a
heightened standard of proof since the welfare of the child requires the
assurance of an accurate and just decision, and the fiscal burdens im-
posed by a heightened standard of proof would be insubstantial.49
After weighing the fundamental interests of the parents in main-
taining familial bonds, the high risk of erroneous terminations inherent
in the proceedings and the State interests involved, the Court held that
proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence was constitutionally
mandated before the State could permanently deprive parents of their
children. 50 Noting that a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
while constitutionally permissible, might unduly burden the State, the
Court held only that proof by clear and convincing 51 evidence was con-
stitutionally mandated.5 2
As a second basis for its decision, the Court relied on its due process
cases in which a higher standard of proof was required to ensure fair-
ness.53 The Court first noted that a standard of proof serves to allocate
the risk of error inherent in the proceedings 54 and to instruct the
factfinder on "the degree of confidence which our society thinks he
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions. ' '55 The Court said
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1401.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1402-03.
51 Id. Clear and convincing proof has been termed an "intermediate standard" of proof,
requiring more than a preponderance of the evidence, yet less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. It is often used in civil cases in which moral turpitude is alleged and in which the
interests at stake are "more substantial than mere loss of money." Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 424 (1979). See also Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S.
276, 285 (1966); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 354 (1960); Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943).
52 102 S. Ct. at 1402-03. The Court noted that a decision to permanently terminate pa-
rental rights often involved "issues difficult to prove to a level of absolute certainty," but left
to the state legislatures the determination of a specific standard of proof equal to or greater
than proof by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
53 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil commitment); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970) (juvenile delinquency); Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385
U.S. 276 (1966) (deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) (denaturaliza-
tion); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (denaturalization).
54 Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1395.
55 Id. (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370).
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that determination of the correct standard of proof "is the kind of ques-
tion which has traditionally been left to the judiciary." 56 When the chal-
lenged standard of proof does not comport with the minimum
requirements of due process courts may decree a higher standard of
proof than that required by the legislature.57
The Court found that proof by a preponderance of the evidence did
not fairly and adequately allocate the risk between the two adversaries
in the proceedings-the State and the parents-since the parents would
suffer a greater loss from an adverse decision. 58 The Court rejected the
contention that the risk should be distributed equally between the chil-
dren and the parents, 59 but added that even if such were the case, the
harm to the children of erroneous non-termination was far less severe
than the harm to the parents of erroneous termination.6 The Court
noted that since the children had been placed in foster homes as a result
of temporary removal proceedings, erroneous non-termination would
only force the child to remain under foster care, unable to seek perma-
nent adoption.6 1 The Court characterized this "uneasy status quo" 62 as
having less negative social impact than an erroneous termination which
would destroy a viable family unit.63
IV. DISSENT
Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissenting opinion, in which the Chief
Justice and Justices White and O'Connor joined.64 He criticized the ma-
jority's "myopic scrutiny of the standard of proof" 65 and the majority's
refusal to examine the Family Court Act as a whole. The Court, Justice
Rehnquist said, should have examined other elements of the Act which
56 &Zn1oS), 102 S. Ct. at 1395 (quoting Woodby, 385 U.S. at 284).
57 Id. It is difficult to reconcile the Court's position here with its decision in Vance v.
Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980), in which the Court held that the judicial preference for clear
and convincing evidence in expatriation hearings was not constitutionally mandated, and
could be overridden by a legislative act.
58 The Court noted that previous cases in which clear and convincing evidence had been
mandated were based on a finding that an adverse decision would result in "a significantdeprivation of liberty," or "stigma." Santosky, 102 . Ct. at 1396. See also supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
59 Id. at 1400-01.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1401. The Court noted that under the New York statutory scheme, a judge had
discretion to extend the original order of temporary removal so that children would not auto-
matically be returned to potentially threatening environments. Id. at 1401 n.16. See supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
62 Id.
63 Id.




made the Family Court Act "fundamentally fair" 66 and therefore consis-
tent with due process. Justice Rehnquist also criticized the Court for
further intruding upon a state's sovereign right to handle domestic rela-
tions.6 7 In addition, Justice Rehnquist stated that a presumption favor-
ing the constitutionality of legislative acts should have been utilized.68
The dissent also said that a preponderance of the evidence standard
adequately allocated the risk of error between the litigants. 69 Unlike the
majority opinion's analysis, Justice Rehnquist considered not only the
parents' and the State's interests, but also the interests of the children. 70
The dissent weighed the parents' interest in the "continuation of the
family unit and the raising of their own children," 7' the State's interest
in the welfare of the child, 72 and the children's interest in a "stable,
loving homelife. ' ' 73 Since the interests of the parents did not clearly out-
weigh the interests of the State and the children, "a State may constitu-




As discussed above, the Court based its decision-that proof by
clear and convincing evidence was required by the Constitution in pa-
rental rights termination proceedings-on two separate lines of cases.
First, the Court balanced the three Eldridge factors and found that, in
parental rights termination hearings, proof by a preponderance of the




'9 Id. at 1403-04.
70 The dissent noted that the parents and the child share an interest in avoiding erroneous
terminations but that a "child's interest in a continuation of the family unit exists only to the
extent that such a continuation would not be harmful to him." Id. at 1412 n.13. The major-
ity criticized the dissent for accepting as factual data "findings that are not part of the record
and that have only been found to be more likely true than not." Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1403
n.1 9 .
71 Id. at 1412.
72 Id. at 1413.
73 Id. at 1412.
74 Id. at 1413. The New York State Legislature had sought, in enacting the Family Court
Act, to balance the various interests involved. The legislative purpose of the Act was stated in
the New York Social Services Law:
It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this section to provide procedures not only
assuring that the rights of the natural parent are protected, but also, where positive,
nurturing parent-child relationships no longer exist, furthering the best interests, needs
and rights of the child by terminating the parental rights and freeing the child for
adoption.
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 384b-l(b) (McKinney 1976).
75 See infia notes 81-119 and accompanying text.
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civil cases in which a specific standard of proof was found to be constitu-
tionally required.76 (This Note will refer to these cases as "standard of
proof" cases.) Although both lines of cases have previously been applied
to determine whether an individual has been deprived of due process,
the two lines of cases treat the issue of risk of error inherent in various
proceedings differently. The cases utilizing the Eldridge test balance pri-
vate and state interests along with an estimation of the amount of error
inherent in the proceedings. The standard of proof cases determine the
allocation of error inherent in the proceedings, as a matter of policy.
A. APPLICATION OF THE MATHEWS V. ELD.RIDGE FACTORS
I. Background
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution guar-
antees "that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law."'77 Having determined that the right to retain
parental ties with one's children is a liberty interest protected by the
fourteenth amendment, 78 the Court in Santosky examined the require-
ments of due process in parental rights termination proceedings. As one
commentator has stated, due process represents "the minimum level of
protection by which the exercise of state power against the individual is
to be controlled."79 Due process requires that essential procedural pro-
tections "assure fairness to the individual so that his notice and opportu-
nity to be heard are meaningful." 0
The Court's battle to come to terms with the precise meaning of
due process has resulted in the emergence of a test set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge.8' The test balances (1) the individual or private interests; (2)
the risk of error created by the challenged procedure and the likelihood
that further safeguards may reduce the likelihood of error; and (3) the
interests of the State in retaining the challenged procedure.8 2
In Eldridge, the Court considered whether the absence of a hearing
prior to termination of social security disability benefits violated the due
76 See infia notes 126-40 and accompanying text.
77 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
78 Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1394. The Court cited: Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978);
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
79 Lawrence, Fairy Due Process: Minimum Protection Recognized But Not Applied in Mathews v.
Eldrdge, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 627, 633.
80 Id.; see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S.
385, 394 (1914).
81 424 U.S. at 335.
82 Id.
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process clause of the Constitution.8 3 The Court first determined that the
claimant's only legitimate interest was in the receipt of uninterrupted
disability benefits.8 4 Second, the Court found that the risk of error was
not high, stating that termination decisions were based on objective cri-
teria.85 As a result, the Court did not consider whether such error might
be reduced by further safeguards. Third, the Court examined the eco-
nomic and administrative interests of the State in not providing pre-
termination hearings, finding them to be substantial.86 After balancing
these factors, the Court noted that "substantial weight must be given to
the good faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with
the administration of social welfare programs that the procedures they
have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of indi-
viduals. '8 7 The Eldidge Court then held that a pre-termination hearing
was not required by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.8
The Court recently applied the Eldridge test in Lassiter v. Department
ofSocial Services,89 in which the State had terminated the parental rights
of an indigent mother for whom the lower court had not appointed
counsel. Ms. Lassiter's child had been adjudged neglected and had been
temporarily removed to the custody of county authorities.90 Ms.
Lassiter was imprisoned as a result of a murder conviction 9 and the
department petitioned the district court to permanently terminate Ms.
Lassiter's parental rights.92 Ms. Lassiter represented herself at the ter-
mination hearing. The court held that her parental rights should be
terminated.93
To determine whether Ms. Lassiter had a constitutional right to
83 Id. at 323.
84 Since decisions of the social security administration were appealable and benefits would
be paid retroactively if the claimant prevailed on appeal, the Court did not recognize any
private economic interest other than an interest in uninterrupted benefits. Id. at 340.
85 Id. at 343. The assumption of objectivity in social security disability determinations is
questionable. Although the definition of disability can be medically determined, the
factfinder must also decide whether, as a result of such disability, the claimant can engage in
"substantially gainful activity." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)(1976). In making this determina-
tion, the factfinder must consider such factors as the age, past work experience and education
of the claimant. For further criticism of the assumption of objectivity, see Marshaw, The
Supreme Court'r Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three
Factors in Search ofa Theoy of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976); Lawrence, supra note 79.
86 Id. at 347.
87 Id. at 349.
88 Id.
89 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
90 Id. at 20.
9t Id.
92 Id. at 20-21.
93 Id. at 24.
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court-appointed counsel, the Court applied the Eldridge test. The Court
said that the individual interest involved in parental termination pro-
ceedings was strong.94 However, the Court found that the gravity of in-
dividual interests at stake may differ from case to case and therefore
must be determined on an ad hoc basis.95
Similarly, in considering the risk of error inherent in the proceed-
ings, the Court found that "the complexity of the proceeding and the
incapacity of the uncounseled parent could be, but would not always be,
great enough to make the risk of erroneous deprivation of the parent's
rights insupportably high."' 96 Thus, the risk of error would also have to
be determined on an ad hoc basis.
Finally, the Court considered the State's interests in saving costs of
appointing counsel, 97 preserving the informality of permanent parental
rights termination hearings98 and obtaining a just decision. 99 The
State's economic interest was found to be insubstantial t°0 and its interest
in preserving informality was found to differ from case to case.10 t After
weighing the three factors and invoking a presumption that counsel
need not be appointed in civil cases, 0 2 the Court concluded that Ms.
Lassiter did not have a constitutional right to court-appointed
counsel. '0 3
B. SANTOSKY V KRAMER
1. Private Interests
In Santosky, the Court recognized the parents' strong interest in
preventing the State from permanently severing their familial bonds.t°4
The Court did not, however, recognize the interests of the children as
legitimate private interests. The Court noted that, "until the State
proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest
94 The Court noted that Ms. Lassiter's interest might have been viewed as more compel-
ling had any of the allegations carried the potential for criminal liability. Id. at 31.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 27-29.
98 Id.
99 Id.
too Although the costs of appointing counsel might be high, the Court found that those
costs were de mimimis compared to the total costs of providing counsel in criminal cases. Id.
at 28.
101 Id. at 31.
102 The Court's use of a presumption in Lassiter has been criticized as "rest[ing] on a dubi-
ous reading of precedent." The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,
95 HARV. L. REV. 93, 138 (1981).
103 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33.
104 Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1397.
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in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship." °10 5
Thus, until the parents are adjudged unfit, a court cannot assume that
the child's best interests lie in terminating parental rights.106
This refusal to consider the rights of the children is analytically cor-
rect, since such consideration would involve the assumption of unproven
facts. Significantly, the refusal may demonstrate the Court's commit-
ment, as a policy matter, to the autonomy of the family unit. 10 7 This
commitment appears strong, since the Court in Sanlosky refused to con-
sider the childrens' interest even where the evidence suggested the possi-
bility of child abuse.
2. Risk of Error
The Court, in Santosky, discussed several factors that contributed to
the risk of error, but which had not been considered in either Eldridge or
Lassiter.108 The Court recognized that the State could control the
amount of contact the parent had with the child prior to the hearing.
Since failure to maintain contact is one element of the State's case, the
Court concluded that the State's control of pre-hearing events increased
the potential for an erroneous termination. 0 9 In addition, the Court
considered that the State's advantage over the individual in litigation,
e.g., the State's greater expertise and financial resources, and the possi-
bility of cultural and class biases affecting a decision, all increased the
risk of an erroneous termination."10
By recognizing these factors, the Court demonstrated a more thor-
ough and realistic understanding of the inherent risk of error than it had
105 Id. at 1398. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 12, at 22, in which
the authors state that during the adjudicatory stages of the proceeding, "the parents remain
qualified to represent the interests of the entire family."
106 Id.
t07 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Fami-
lies, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-.52 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923).
108 In ascertaining the risk of error, the Court in Eldridge considered only the reliability of
the established procedures. The Court found them to be reliable based on the lack of subjec-
tivity involved in the decision. Since the decision would be based on objective criteria, the
procedure of providing only for written review was found to be permissible. Eldridge, 424
U.S. at 343-47.
In Lassiter, the Court found the statutory requirement of proof by clear and convincing
evidence to be an adequate assurance of accurate decisions. The Court considered the par-
ent's lack of education and sophistication as factors contributing to the risk of error. The
Court did not discuss any other factors. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30.
109 See supra note 41.
110 Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1399.
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in either Eldridge or Lassiter. I This thorough understanding is essential
to accurately assess the risk of error in a challenged procedure. If the
Court continues to utilize this realistic approach, the Eldn'dge test can be
a valuable method for determining whether due process has been
satisfied.
3. State Interests
The Court found that the parenspatriae interest of the State in the
welfare of the child would be served by a higher standard of proof. In
doing so, the Court assumed that the risk of error contemplated by the
Eldridge test measures both erroneous terminations and erroneous non-
terminations, since both would be damaging to the welfare of the child.
However, prior Supreme Court analyses of risk of error have considered
only the error which may result from decisions adverse to the individ-
ual.112 Both Eldridge and Lassiter considered only those errors which
could unduly benefit the State, but did not consider errors which might
unduly benefit the individual."t 3 Similarly, in Santosky, the Court said
that the risk of error was the error inherent in requiring proof by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence which might adversely affect the parents."l 4
The Court's requirement of clear and convincing evidence will not cause
fewer errors to be made; it will lead only to the State bearing most of the
risk of erroneous decisions. 15 When the State must prove its case by a
preponderance of the evidence, the individual and the State share
equally in the risk of error. 16 As the standard of proof is raised, society
imposes more of the risk upon itself, 1 7 though the amount of error re-
mains the same. Thus, the Court failed to consider that the State'sparens
S11 The Eldridge decision was criticized for its limited view of the risk of error inherent in
social security disability determinations. See Marshaw, supra note 85, at 41, which criticizes
the Court's analysis of the risk of error as "incomplete" and Lawrence, supra note 79, which
criticizes the Court for disregarding certain facts in its determination of inherent risk of error.
The Court in Eldridge concluded that termination decisions carried a low risk of error by
assuming that the decisions were based on purely objective criteria. See supra notes 85-108.
In Lassiter, the Court was willing to look at factors such as the lack of education of the
parent, but declined to find that these factors indicated an inherent risk of error. Lassiter, 452
U.S. at 30-31. See supra note 108. Instead, the Court found that such factors may operate to
create a high risk of eror and should be examined on a case-by-case basis. Lassiter, 452 U.S.
at 31.
112 See generaly Santosky, 102 S. Ct. 1388; Lassiter, 452 U.S. 27; Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319.
113 See supra notes 108, 111 and accompanying text.
114 Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1398-1400.
15 Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. See also Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales ofJustice: Burdens
of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE LJ. 1299, 1306 (1977), which notes that one use of a
higher standard of proof is to compensate for the possibility that the factfinder may subjec-
tively favor the State.
116 Id.
17 Id. at 424.
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patrize interest includes the prevention of both erroneous terminations
and erroneous non-terminations, 1 8 and would therefore not necessarily
be served by a higher standard of proof.
Furthermore, by finding that a higher standard of proof would
serve the State's interest, the Court only considered the State's interest
in the proposed procedure, rather than its interest in retaining the existing
procedure. In Eldridge, the Court contemplated the State's interest in
retaining the existing procedure' 19 since it was the constitutionality of
that procedure that was at issue. The Court in Santosky, therefore,
should have ascertained only the State interests which would have sup-
ported the retention of the standard of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.
4. Use of Presumptions
The Court, in dicta, approved of the use of a presumption of consti-
tutionality in conjunction with the Eldridge factors, but declined to ap-
ply such a presumption.1 20 The Eldridge test, as enunciated in Mathews v.
Eldridge, did not include a presumption favoring the constitutionality of
the challenged procedure.1 21 In Lassiter, the Court employed the pre-
sumption that counsel need not be appointed in parental rights termina-
tion proceedings. 22 In Santosky, however, the Court distinguished the
use of a presumption by noting that "[u]nlike the Court's right to coun-
sel rulings, [the Court's] decisions concerning constitutional burdens of
proof have not turned on any presumption favoring any particular
standard."123
The Court's distinction in Santosky is conceptually valid. One
would have hoped, however, that the Court would have gone further
and held that the use of such presumptions in conjunction with the El-
dridge factors is never appropriate. The use of a presumption has been
criticized as an unnecessary and harmful addition to the Eldridge test. 124
By adding this presumption to the three factor test, the Court increased
the quantum of evidence that an individual is required to produce to
establish the unconstitutionality of a given procedure. An individual
must not only prove that a consideration of the Eldridge factors will lead
to the conclusion that he or she was deprived of due process, but must
118 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
119 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
120 Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1394-95.
121 Eldnidge, 424 U.S. at 335.
122 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
123 Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1394-95.
124 See The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 102; Note, The Termination of Parental R4hs:
Lassiter and the New Illinois Termination Law, 13 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 135, 154 (1981).
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prove this by enough additional evidence to rebut the presumption that
the procedure was constitutional. The Eldridge factors were developed
to determine whether an individual had been deprived of due process
under the law. The individual carries a sufficient burden in proving de-
privation of due process through a balancing of the E/dridge factors
alone. To increase this burden by introducing a presumption of consti-
tutionality unduly burdens the individual in the attempt to protect con-
stitutional rights.125
VI. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE STANDARD OF PROOF CASES
The second basis for the Santosky Court's decision is its determina-
tion that the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process
clause should reflect not only the weight of the private and public inter-
ests affected, but also "a societal judgment about how the risk of error
should be distributed between the litigants."' 26 This approach differs
from the Eldridge approach in that it contemplates a judicial policy deci-
sion regarding the allocation of the amount of error in a given proceed-
ing. ' 27 Since the allocation of error will affect the relative frequency of
erroneous terminations and erroneous non-terminations, 28 the determi-
nation of a standard of proof should "reflect an assessment of the com-
parative social disutility of each."' 2 9 Thus, to determine the proper
allocation of error in a parental rights termination hearing, the Court
considered whether, as a matter of social policy, it is worse to errone-
ously separate a viable family or to erroneously keep an abused or ne-
glected child in foster care, ineligible for adoption. 130
In criminal cases, due process requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt.' 3 In re Winship,' 3 2 the Court confronted
the standard of proof question as it applies to civil cases in which the
individual is threatened with a significant deprivation of physical lib-
erty. The Court there found that in juvenile delinquency proceedings,
which are civil in nature, due process required proof beyond a reason-
able doubt that the juveniles committed the illegal acts with which they
125 See The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 102, at 138.
126 Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1395.
127 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343-47, contemplated only the amount of error.
128 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370-71 (Harlan, J., concurring).
129 Id. at 371.
130 SantosAy, 102 S. Ct. at 1400-01.
'31 See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Holland v. United States, 348
U.S. 121, 138 (1954); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949); Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1914); Holt v.
United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895);
Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881).
132 397 U.S. 358.
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were charged.133 The Court based its decision on the social stigma at-
tached to juvenile deliquents and on the significant deprivation of physi-
cal liberty that could result from a decision against the individual. 34
Later, in the landmark case of Addington v. Texas, 135 the Court held
that, in a civil proceeding to commit an individual to a mental institu-
tion, a higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence
was constitutionally mandated. 136 The Court again based its holding on
the stigma attached to commitment to a mental institution and on the
significant deprivation of physical liberty that would result from a deci-
sion against the individual.13 7 The Court declined to hold that the State
must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to the Court's desire
to retain this standard of proof for cases involving moral turpitude.138
Additionally, the Court said that because of the inherent uncertainties
associated with psychiatric diagnoses, requiring the State to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt was unduly burdensome1 39 Instead,
the Court held that the necessity for commitment must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence. 4°
Since both Winship and Addington involve significant deprivations of
physical liberty, the Santosky Court appears to have added termination of
parental rights-a non-physical fundamental liberty-to the types of
civil proceedings in which proof by a mere preponderance of the evi-
dence is constitutionally insufficient. Although it is difficult to ascertain
how securely the Court rests its holding on the standard of proof cases,
as opposed to the Eldridge test, Santosky seems to signal the Court's will-
ingness to extend constitutionally based standard of proof protection to
cases in which deprivation of physical liberty is not at issue.
VII. CONCLUSION
Under the Eldridge analysis, the Court in Santosy concluded that
(1) parents' interest in maintaining the family was fundamental; (2) the
risk of erroneously terminating parental rights was inherently high; and
(3) the State's interests in retaining its preponderance of the evidence
standard of proof in these proceedings were insubstantial. In its treat-
ment of private interests, the Court demonstrated a high regard for fa-
milial rights. The Court's willingness to consider a myriad of factors in
133 Id. at 368; see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (guaranteeing due process safe-
guards to inmates in mental institutions).
134 397 U.S. at 368.
135 441 U.S. 418.
136 Id. at 427.
137 Id. at 425-27.
138 Id. at 428.
139 Id. at 430.
140 Id. at 431-33.
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determining the risk of error could result in a more viable due process
balancing test. The Court's consideration of the State's interests, how-
ever, did not adequately focus on whether sufficient State interests sup-
ported retaining the challenged procedure. Finally, although declining
to apply a presumption in Santosky, the Court did not expressly reject the
use of a presumption in conjunction with the Eldridge test.
In examining standard of proof cases, the Court said that the termi-
nation of parental rights required a standard of proof greater than proof
by a preponderance of the evidence. This determination represents a
departure from past standard of proof cases in which only deprivation of
physical liberty was held to mandate a higher standard of proof. The
invalidation of the New York Family Court Act then, represents a signif-
icant policy decision favoring the retention of the viable or potentially
viable family unit in cases in which neglect can be proven by only a
preponderance of the evidence.
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